India–US Relations: A Lot Depends On The Alaska Summit

The upcoming Donald Trump-Vladimir Putin Alaska Summit could determine whether secondary sanctions on India intensify. The India–US relationship, once hailed as a defining strategic partnership of the 21st century, now faces a moment of renewed uncertainty. After two decades of steadily narrowing the strategic gap between New Delhi and Washington, the trajectory appears to be at risk of sliding back toward an era when the two capitals frequently stood at odds. The foundation of this modern partnership was built on India's economic rise, its gradual shedding of long-held strategic caution, and its willingness to embrace deeper defence and political ties with the United States. Over the past decade, this alignment was reinforced by the signing of four key "foundational" defence agreements, closer cooperation in sensitive areas such as space and advanced technology, and the launch of institutional mechanisms like the 2+2 ministerial dialogue, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), and TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology) to enhance collaboration in high-end research and innovation. Trump’s turn The return of Donald Trump to the White House has brought a sharp inflection point to the relationship. While the Joe Biden administration had already been contending with difficult externalities, particularly the ripple effects of the Russia–Ukraine war, Trump’s second term has amplified these pressures by adopting a harder, more transactional stance toward India. Perhaps, the most striking flashpoint has been Trump’s willingness to threaten and apply secondary sanctions on countries importing Russian oil, India among them. While China remains the largest buyer of Russian crude, and Europe continues to receive substantial volumes of Russian LNG, the Trump administration has chosen to spotlight India’s purchases, a move that has raised eyebrows not just in Delhi but in Washington as well. The Alaska summit, where Trump’s anticipated meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin is going to take place this week, now looms as a pivotal moment. Though framed primarily as a potential step toward ending the Russia–Ukraine conflict, its outcomes could have cascading effects on India–US ties, particularly on the question of whether these secondary sanctions will remain, intensify, or be lifted. Trump’s blurred crosshairs There are three primary factors behind Trump’s hard stance on India. First, Trump’s frustrations with unresolved global conflicts have led him to search for quick, decisive outcomes, often by applying direct pressure on actors he believes can be moved. This approach collides with the reality that wars rooted in deep-seated geography, history, and cultural divisions such as the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza are rarely resolved on tight deadlines. By setting artificial timetables for peace, Trump risks overestimating his leverage and underestimating the entrenched nature of these disputes. Second, Trump’s trade policy calculus plays a role. His trade team’s inability to secure greater access to India’s agricultural and dairy markets has prompted him to use sanctions as an indirect form of negotiation. By linking sanctions relief to both Russia-related compliance and broader trade concessions, Trump is attempting to tackle two policy objectives at once, although at the risk of alienating a key partner. The imposition of 50 per cent tariffs alongside secondary sanctions has so far not elicited a significant policy shift from New Delhi, potentially deepening Trump’s irritation. Third, there is a political dimension tied to Trump’s reaction. The Trump administration has been frustrated by New Delhi’s refusal to publicly credit Trump for playing a behind-the-scenes role in averting a major India–Pakistan conflict in May this year. While India has its own reasons for downplaying such mediation claims, the episode has added a personal edge to Trump’s approach. The Stakes of the Alaska Meeting Much will depend on what unfolds when Trump and Putin meet in Alaska. A breakthrough agreement is widely considered unlikely, given the hardened positions on both sides. The best-case scenario would be an agreement to hold follow-up talks involving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, opening a more structured path toward conflict resolution. For Putin, the meeting will be a chance to gauge Trump’s strategic intentions: Will the US ease sanctions in exchange for a ceasefire, or will it double down if Russia continues its battlefield advances? If the talks fail, a prevailing expectation, Trump is likely to escalate secondary sanctions, particularly against India, which is perceived in Washington as a more pliable target than China. Beijing’s larger economic leverage over the US, combined with ongoing US–China trade negotiations, makes punitive measures against China politically and economically riskier for Trump. While further sanctions might inflict economic pain on Moscow, expecting them to force a rapid change in Russian behaviour may be overly optimistic. If the Alaska summit fails, Trump may find himself boxed into a Russia policy quagmire - one in which his options narrow and his ability to claim a diplomatic victory diminishes. In such a scenario, the temptation to extract “wins” elsewhere could grow. Unfortunately, this dynamic risks holding one of America’s most consequential bilateral relationships - its partnership with India - hostage to the vagaries of Trump’s Russia strategy. Bilateral Matters India–US ties are no longer just about defence sales or annual summits. They have evolved into a broad-based partnership encompassing technology co-development, climate cooperation, joint military exercises, counterterrorism coordination, and supply chain resilience efforts. The Indo-Pacific strategy, in particular, hinges on close alignment between Washington and New Delhi to balance China’s influence. A rupture or even a prolonged chill in the relationship could reverberate beyond the bilateral sphere. It could weaken the Quad’s cohesion, slow progress on critical technology sharing, and give China more room to manoeuvre in Asia. Moreover, India’s foreign policy doctrine of “strategic autonomy” means it is unlikely to bend fully to US pressure on Russia, suggesting that sanctions will not achieve the compliance Washington seeks without imposing collateral damage on shared interests. The Alaska summit, therefore, is about more than US–Russia relations. It is a bellwether for the trajectory of US–India engagement in Trump’s second term. A constructive outcome that opens channels for broader peace talks could ease the sanctions climate and create space for both Washington and New Delhi to refocus on their strategic agenda. Conversely, a failed summit could see Trump doubling down on punitive measures, increasing the risk of a bilateral rift at a time when the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture demands closer India–US coordination, not less. For now, both sides will watch Alaska closely, aware that the decisions made there may ripple across continents. For India, the challenge will be to safeguard its strategic autonomy while preserving the hard-earned gains of two decades of partnership. For the US, the question is whether it will allow a single foreign policy gambit to jeopardize one of its most valuable relationships in Asia. First published at ETV